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Abstract
Ethnicity is an important institution and one that impacts on the quality of
governance. This paper focuses on the behavior of ethnic groups and specifically
on their impact on the provision of public goods. The paper shows that ethnic
heterogeneity results in under-provision of non-excludable public goods. On the
other hand, such societies associate with provision of patronage goods. The paper
proposes some areas of research such the economics of ethnic institutions, empirical evidence of the role ethnic groups on public goods provision, tax compliance
and institutional reforms to improve governance.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D70, D74, H41
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I. Introduction
One of the legitimate functions of government is the provision of public goods.2 This is particularly so
in the case of pure public goods-- defined as those that are non-excludable, non-rival and indivisible in
production and consumption. These conditions result in a situation where the market fails to provide
the goods efficiently and in sufficient quantities. Non-excludability implies that limiting access to a
good or service is difficult or can be extremely costly and therefore private provision is not feasible
because of the free-rider problem. Left to the market, such goods will either not be produced at all or
will be under-provided. The non-rival characteristic of public goods implies that the consumption by
one consumer does not reduce the quantity available to other consumers. Thus, the marginal cost of
providing the good to another consumer is zero. The fact that production and consumption of a
public good are indivisible implies that the good cannot be divided up and sold. Even if such goods
were excludable, private provision would be inefficient since firms would charge positive prices.
Governments also provide what are called impure or quasi public goods. These are goods that are only
partially rival or partially excludable. While such goods could be provided by the private markets, the
levels may not be efficient. By and large, markets will tend to produce those commodities with public
goods characteristics in inefficiently small quantities.3
The standard assumption is that when government steps into correct for market failure, it does so
with the intention of maximizing social welfare and does so efficiently. Nevertheless, government
provision is itself marred by numerous inefficiencies and shortcomings--what is referred to as
government failure (Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Olson (1965). A particularly important explanation

Other reasons for government intervention include the existence of positive and negative externalities; income
distribution and regulation of business firms where competition is not feasible. In some cases, governments
engage in provision of what are referred to as "merit" goods.
3 When such goods are provided by the market, government intervention in form of regulation is often essential.
2
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for government failure is provided by the interest-group theory of government. The interest-group
theory of government posits that public policy makers are not benevolent maximizers of social welfare
as assumed by the market failure model but are instead motivated by self interests. In particular, policy
makers seek to maximize their well-being and engage in wealth transfers in order to buy political
support. Thus, well-organised redistributive coalitions advance narrow interests against a backdrop of
mass “rational ignorance”. This means that the political allocation that replaces market allocation is
itself not efficient. In addition, public provision is subject to rent-seeking which associates with waste
of resources and other inefficiencies (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1975). Other factors that explain the
inefficiencies of government provision focus on the principal agent problems inherent in public
provision. The principal agent problems arise form the fact that voters are not motivated to invest
resources to monitor the behavior of public officials. One the one hand, public provision lacks welldefined property rights because voters are numerous and dispersed. No single individual has sufficient
wealth at stake to make it worthwhile to monitor government officials on a day-to-day basis.
Furthermore, the government output is often difficult to measure relative to inputs. Public employees
therefore have a great deal of discretion that they exploit to advance own interest at expense of the
general public (Shughart and Kimenyi 1991). All these factors undermine the quality of public
provision. Because of weaker institutions of governance, these problems are more pronounced in
poor countries.
A growing body of research shows that one factor influencing the quality of governance in the
provision of public goods is the degree of ethnic fractionalization. In other words, other things equal,
government failure associated with collective provision is more serious in societies that are more
heterogeneous than those that are homogeneous. One way that ethnicity could increase the probability
of government failure is by increasing the transaction costs of achieving cooperation and thus
weakening institutions of governance. The literature further shows that the failure to take
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heterogeneity in the design of institutions has contributed to governance failures in countries with high
degrees of ethnic fractionalization. Thus, by ignoring the importance of ethnicity in institutional
design, many ethnically fractionalized developing countries are not suited to harmonize ethnic claims
(Kimenyi 1998). Given the high degree of ethnic fractionalization in Africa, it is conceivable that this
could be one of the reasons for poor governance in the continent. The basic premise of this paper is
that ethnicity is an important institution and one that influences public policy outcomes. The paper is
in the spirit of new institutional economics and basically considers ethnic groups as units of collective
choice. On the one hand, ethnic groups complicate collective action translating into outcomes that
make all members of the society worse off. On the other hand, ethnic units lower the transaction costs
of solving prisoners dilemma problems and thus are suited to provide local public goods.
This paper is about how ethnicity impacts on governance in the provision of public goods. If in
fact ethnicity does impact on the quality of governance, then such should impact on the quality and
other dimensions of public provision. In the next section, the paper reviews the literature that links
ethnicity to governance. Section III focuses more specifically on the impact of ethnic fractionalization
on the provision of public goods and provides relevant examples in Africa. Section IV concludes with
a discussion of policy implications and proposal for research agenda.

II.

Ethnicity, Governance and Collective Action

An increasing number of studies suggest that there is a link between ethnicity and economic outcomes.
A comprehensive study on ethnicity and governance by Horowitz (1985) provides an in-depth analysis
of ethnicity and institutions in a wide range of countries and basically concludes that ethnicity is an
important institution and one that is responsible for many outcomes observed in those societies.
Horowitz also presents some proposals for institutional design that takes ethnicity into. Other authors
have come to similar conclusions in terms of the importance of ethnicity as an institution. For
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example, some of the recent studies on ethnicity and institutions find that ethnically diverse societies
are prone to corruption and poor governance, conflict and slow economic growth (Kimenyi 1987;
Easterly and Lavine 1997; Mauro 1995; Mbaku, Ogbese and Kimenyi 2001; Kimenyi 1997).
Considering the high degree of ethnic fractionalization in Africa, an understanding of how ethnic
institutions impacts on collective action is crucial. This section focuses on the behavior of ethnic
groups that could impact on collective provision.
One of the most striking features of African countries is the degree of ethnic heterogeneity.
Sub-Saharan African countries are home to over 2,000 distinct ethnic groups that are characterized by
different language, culture and traditions. The size of the ethnic groups varies from millions of people
to a few hundred thousands. Heterogeneity in Africa is magnified by the wide range of religious
beliefs. Another important feature of the African societies is that ethnic groups associate with a
particular territory —what is referred to as geo-ethnicity. By and large, ethnic groups have what they
consider to be their territory. Cobbach (1988) observes that:
In Africa, this ethnic identity is above all other things a territorial identity. Nothing defines
the ethnic group better than its ‘standing place’. Thus the term geoethnicity has been used to
describe the African ethnic phenomenon. Geoethincity as opposed to non-territorial ethnic
identification involves the historic identification of an ethnic group with a given territory, an
attachment to a particular place, a sense of place as a symbol of being and identity (p. 73)
Thus, by and large, ethnic units make up what could be called "ethnic nations.” Geo-ethnicity
implies that provision of public goods in a particular area primarily benefits members of a distinct
group. This will be true for most spatial public goods.
An important fact is that in Africa, individuals tend to associate strongly with members of
their ethnic groups. Ethnic groups have through the years continued to remain distinct with members
identifying strongly with their ethnic group. By and large, identifying with ones ethnic group is highly
valued and resources are devoted to make certain that members of a group continue to identify with
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that group. Children are taught to identify and be proud of their tribe and ethnic identity is strongly felt
and behavior based on ethnicity is normatively sanctioned (Horowitz 1985).

Through this

identification process, groups adopt various customs, beliefs and ways of doing things all which tend
to bide the members of the group and separate them from others. More trust is nurtured amongst
members of the group and in essence, members of an ethnic groups see themselves as different from
others.
One of the explanations why ethnicity may impact on economic and other outcomes is simply
that there are systematic differences in preferences and endowments across ethnic groups. For
example, it is conceivable that preferences for a particular public good vary across different groups. If
this were the case, then it can be expected that there would be differences in the desired levels and mix
of public goods. Systematic differences in preferences could arise from history, custom and geography.
However, the most credible explanation as to why ethnicity may impact on collective provision is
through its effect on governance.
Unlike private provision, collective provision is associated with numerous governance
challenges. A particular governance problem in public provision is coordination. Collective action
involves various forms of transaction costs related to cooperation—that is costs of bringing people
together to cooperate in organizing for the provision of a good including payment of taxes. Good
governance in the provision of public goods therefore requires an institutional framework that reduces
the costs of cooperation. Such an institutional framework could be supplied by experience built up
through repeated interactions, a high level of social cohesion, trust or a constitutional and legal regime
characterized by effectiveness and legitimacy (Meagher 2003). In essence, where interests are
encompassing amongst the members of a society, transaction costs of achieving cooperation is low and
collective action is enhanced. Thus, improvements in public provision require institutions that reduce
the transaction costs of cooperation.
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The insight by Mucur Olson (1989) on roving and stationary bandits is particularly relevant.
Traditional Chinese villages were ruled by two types of bandits. The first was a group of bandits that
moved from village to village robbing and looting the produce from the farmers. Different groups of
bandits would separately loot the villages in a disorganized manner. These roving bandits had not
interest on the well-being of farmers as they received large benefits from plundering. In addition,
plunder was seen as a common pool resource available for exploitation by the various bands. As it
were, roving bandits did not undertake any investments in public goods that would have improved the
well-being of the villagers and increase production. Over time, however, the regime of roving banditary
was not sustainable which gave rise to stationary banditary. These were bandits who settled in the
villages and monopolized rent extraction. In this case, plunder was no longer a common pool resource.
Stationary bandits therefore had an interest in good economic performance (higher output) because
they stood to reap those benefits. Thus, stationary bandits have an incentive to provide public goods
such as a legal system, security, et. at levels that are beneficial for the economy in general. Here,
encompassing interests results in cooperation that enhances public provision.
The logic of the roving and stationary bandits can be extended to explain governance in
ethnically fractionalized societies (Meagher 2003). First, of course is that the quality of governance will
depend on the extent of cooperation among the various social factions. More efficient governance
structures will emerge where the various factions cooperate, where their shares of any inefficiencies or
losses imposed by government are closer to equal, and where the number of such factions is small.
Second, in the case of public good provision, the likelihood of a majority ethnic group engaging in
inefficient distribution to itself or disinvestment in public good rises as the group’s exclusive hold on
power erodes. That is when one or more minority groups grows in number and voice posing a threat
to the dominant group’s hold on power and resources (Alesina et. al 1997; Batancourt and Gleason
1998).

As noted by Meagher (2003), the analysis provides some idea as to the potential for
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cooperation in plural societies based on relative size and power of factions in the polity. Very small and
relatively invisible minorities pose no dilemma of cooperation to the majority, perhaps because the
former are too small to bear all the costs of governance inefficiencies. Factions of equal size and
inclusiveness are forced to negotiate a framework of coordination to meet shared objectives.
An explanation as to why ethnicity may influence collective action and which reduces
cooperation is that ethnic groups behave much like special interest groups. The interest-group theory
of government as applied to ethnic groups assumes that ethnic groups seek to maximize the welfare of
their members at the expense of others. Like other interest groups such as labor unions or producer
groups, ethnic groups necessarily adopt strategies that give them an advantage in influencing policy
decisions. The most efficient way for ethnic groups to influence policy is to capture the means of
wealth transfers (that is the government). Kimenyi (1987) attributes the intense ethnic competition for
political power as one of the outcomes of interest-group behavior. Unlike other interest groups,
however, ethnic interest are more durable since exit and entry into such groups is limited. Thus, ethnic
groups form what are referred to as ‘permanent interest groups’ (Kimenyi 1987). Competition amongst
permanent interest groups can be expected to be more intense and continous than is the case with
other interest groups. Such competition has implications on provision of public goods.
The interest-group theory of government can help explain a number of outcomes in ethnically
divided countries. First of course is that there will be a tendency for the ethnic groups in power to
transfer higher benefits to members of their group. In the case of public goods, it can be expected that
ethnic groups that control the government will adopt those strategies that make it difficult for other
groups to capture the instruments of wealth transfers. Not surprisingly, the competition to control the
instruments of wealth transfers has been intense in most African countries and has been one of the
underlying causes of ethnic conflicts. This analysis helps explain at least in part, the continued state of
conflict and political instability in Africa where there are many ethnic groups that attempt to control
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governments. Of course such competition and ensuing conflicts impact on economic performance and
also government provision.
Another governance outcome that is associated with ethnicity is corruption. A common
example of how ethnic fractionalization associates with corruption relates to patronage and nepotism
in the public sector. Patronage and nepotism refer to the situation of extending benefits to members
of one’s family, friends, or ethnic group while discriminating other people who are considered
outsiders. In Africa, the most common form of corruption entails the distribution of rewards, jobs,
contracts, and promotions, on the basis of ethnicity. Horowitz (1994) notes that, “in severely divided
societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be
excluded… In ethnic politics, Inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and non
material goods, including the prestige of the various ethnic groups and the identity of the state as
belonging more to one group than another.”(p.35).
Preferential treatment of members of one’s ethnic group may primarily be a strategy to buy
stability. Many African countries are under autocratic or semi autocratic rule. In these types of
systems, stability of the government largely depends on maintaining a small supporting coalition intact.
In other words, stability requires that the sharing coalition be small as possible. Members of other
ethnic groups have the desire to remove the ruler in power and replace him with a member of their
own ethnic group. Stability is therefore, a primary concern to leaders in ethnically divided societies and
rulers must therefore surround themselves with trusted members of their own ethnic group. Brough
and Kimenyi (1986) present a model that explains the tendency of rulers to recruit bureaucrats
primarily from their own ethnic group. In this model, a ruler can increase the efficiency of the
bureaucracy by appointing individuals from all the ethnic groups with the primary criteria being their
competency. But such hiring practices that include members of other ethnic groups weaken the ruling
coalition as benefits of the regime are shared by all ethnic groups. The result is that, by seeking to be
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efficient, the regimes risk instability. Thus, a leader faces the tradeoff between efficiency and stability.
Since the most important objective of rulers is to maximize their tenure in office, then they almost
always must recruit disproportionately from their ethnic groups in order to maintain the supporting
coalition intact.
Figure 1 shows the choice facing a ruler of a country that has many ethnic factions. The
horizontal axis shows the percentage of senior civil servants who belong to other ethnic groups other
than the ruler’s ethnic group. The vertical axis measures regime stability. The concave curve, SE,
shows the trade-off between stability and hiring from outside the ruler’s ethnic group. In this model,
the higher levels of stability are achieved when top civil servants are primarily from the ruler’s own
ethnic group. As more and more senior servants are recruited outside the supporting coalition,
stability decreases. The general assumption is that such hiring dilutes the benefits of the supporting
coalition.
The percentage of senior civil servants from outside, the rulers ethnic group is determined by
the tangency between the ruler's highest indifference curve and the trade-off between stability and
members of other ethnic groups hired. By and large, given the desire to remain in power, leaders will
tend to employ members of their own group so as to maintain the ruling coalition intact.4
More recently, Kimenyi (1997) compared ethnic groups to firms that organize for production.
Each ethnic group can be considered as a monopolist faced with a downward sloping demand curve
and an upward sloping marginal cost of producing “ethnic” goods. Efficient production increases the
producer and consumer surplus which essentially is a measure of an ethnic group’s well being. As can
be expected, ethnic groups within the same country are likely to be vastly different in terms of their
ability to generate surplus. Each ethnic group can increase its ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ surplus by entering

As will be seen later, this means that there is a preference for patronage goods at the expense of non-excludable
goods.
4
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into mutually beneficial exchange with other ethnic groups. Thus, under conditions whereby ethnic
groups are able to freely organize production and enter into market exchange with other groups, each
ethnic group would seek to be efficient in production in order to increase its surplus. But efficiency in
production is not the only way that an ethnic group can increase its surplus. One attractive alternative
is to use the political process to capture the surplus generated by other groups. Under a system of
government where taxing and spending decisions are centralized, then rulers are able to redistribute
surplus from some ethnic groups to others. Given the fact that ethnic groups occupy different
regions, governments are able to direct the resources to specific groups. Thus, we can expect leaders
to allocate relatively larger shares of public resources to areas where members of their ethnic groups
live.
A system of redistributing benefits from some groups to others could result in a number of
governance issues. For one, groups that are taxpayers have an incentive to under-report and conceal
their earnings. In other words, ethnicity could impact on tax compliance and consequently on public
provision. Public goods are of course financed by taxes and therefore, tax compliance is an important
factor in determining provision of public goods. A determinant of the extent of tax compliance is the
degree of trust and cohesiveness in society. By and large, low trust societies are characterized by
markedly lower levels of tax compliance than high trust societies. Experimental evidence from Social
and Political Psychology has established that the level of trust and the degree of trustworthiness
decreases with ethnic diversity (Zucker, 1986; Tyler, 1998; Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and Ferrara,
2002). Further experimental evidence has established that tax compliance increases with trust (Scholz
and Pinney, 1995; scholz and Lubell, 1998a, b; Scholz, 1998). The argument given is that people are
willing to comply if they know that everyone else complies. If people do not trust others to comply,
they choose to evade taxes themselves.
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Tax compliance could be affected by ethnic fragmentation through social sanctions or norms.
Olson (1965) argues that social sanctions can provide ‘selective incentives,’ in facilitating public goods
provision and, therefore, as noted by Roth, Scholz and Witte (1989), social stigma associated with noncompliance could improve compliance. For social sanctions to be effective, however, it is important
that individuals are affected by such sanctions. To the extent that individuals are affected mainly by
social sanctions exercised by their own ethnic group, such sanctions will not be as effective in
ethnically fragmented communities as in more homogeneous communities (Lassen, 2003).
Levi (1988) argues that voluntary tax compliance will occur only when taxpayers have confidence
that rulers will keep their bargain and that other constituents will keep theirs. Taxpayers are strategic
actors who will cooperate only when they can expect others to cooperate as well. Thus, the compliance
of each depends on the compliance of others. Levi observes that voluntary tax compliance is
influenced by two by social contracts. The horizontal contract (which concerns the perceived fairness
of the tax payment) and vertical contract (which concerns what has been called the quid pro quo of
taxation). Tax compliance largely depends on two issues: First is whether taxpayers get sufficient
public goods in exchange for taxes paid. This is sometimes referred to as exchange equity (Spicer and
Lundstedt, 1976). Second issue is whether taxpayers get the public goods mix they prefer. If taxpayers
do not consider the benefits they get as comparable to the tax burden they bear, they will then tend to
reduce their tax compliance. To the extent that leaders tend to allocate relatively more public resources
to members of their ethnic group, it can be expected that other communities react by lowering their
tax compliance. A secondary result is of course that overall tax revenue collections decline and thus
the quality of public provision declines in ethnically fragmented societies.
Empirical evidence shows that public goods provision and participation is lower in ethnically
fragmented societies (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel, 2001).
The possible reasons suggested are that different ethnic groups may prefer different public goods
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mixes and, further, that people may not want to contribute to public goods benefiting other ethnic
groups. Alesina et al. (1999) argue that the lower provision is determined through the political process,
as tax payers exercise their voice option. Another way through which groups can express their
discontent is to use the exit option. When taxpayers feel that the public goods mix provided is much
different from what they would have preferred themselves, or that the goods benefit people with
whom they do not identify or that the rate of transformation is low due to pervasive corruption with
much rents being appropriated by public officials and politicians, then the attractiveness of the quid
pro quo contract is diminished, and there by lowering voluntary compliance to the tax code.
Ethnic groups also organize for the provision of public goods to their members. We have
noted that individuals identify strongly with particular groups. For example, ethnic identification in
politics is revealed by the patterns of voting. No matter which country one looks at, it has become
clear that people vote very much on ethnic lines, and political ideology in the western sense rarely plays
a significant role. The fact that we observe high degrees of ethnic identification implies that the
expected benefits of identifying with a tribal group exceed the costs of such identification. One such
benefit is the self-provision of public goods.
The strong ties within ethnic groups makes such groups ideally suited as units of collective
choice that organize for public goods provision. This is because ethnicity economizes on
organizational costs. In particular ethnic based institutions have a comparative advantage in solving
prisoner's dilemma problems. Because members of an ethnic groups have a long-term attachment to
their groups (for example, through blood or past memories), they are more likely to have continuos
dealings with members of their ethnic group than with members of other ethnic groups. Continuous
dealing reduces cheating in prisoner's dilemma situations and as a result ethnic groups may be more
efficient in the provision of public goods than the state (Roback 1991). Simply put, within an ethnic
group, cooperation is easier to elicit than when more groups are involved. The free-rider problem is
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likely to be less prevalent when the group is made up of one ethnic group than when several ethnic
groups are involved. It is because of this reason that, by and large, voluntary associations in Africa
almost always form along ethnic lines. In essence, ethnic groups are analogous to clubs.
Kimenyi (1998) extends the club model to ethnic provision of public goods. In the theory of
clubs, individuals with similar or closely related interests cooperate in the provision of excludable
public goods--club goods. Kimenyi compares ethnic groups to voluntary associations or clubs whose
members have fairly homogenous preferences. Following the model of clubs as developed by
Buchanan (1965), the optimal size of the club is determined by the membership at which marginal cost
is equal to marginal benefit. In this model, the costs and benefits increase and decrease steadily as
membership increases. Based on previous discussion, organizing collective activities by one ethnic
group is expected to resemble the club model where costs and benefits increase and decrease steadily
as membership increases (Figure 2). This is because the ethnic group possesses various advantages that
economize on organizational costs (Landa 1994).
The benefits and costs change more dramatically when more than one ethnic group is
involved (Figure 3 and 4). Organizing across different ethnic groups is more complicated and adding
members from other ethnic groups creates a discontinuity in the costs and benefits. Such
discontinuities result from difficulties in communicating across ethnic and linguistic boundaries and
also because of differences in preferences, taste, and also because of the fact there is less trust across
ethnic groups than within the same ethnic group. The implication of this club model is that ethnic
groups may be suited to organize for the production of local public goods.
Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), in their analysis of multi-ethnic societies argue that ethnic
salience can result in “ethnicization of collectively provided goods” in the sense that the political
process allocates excludable public goods and transfers based on ethnic characteristics (favouritism).
The failure of the state to insure nonexcludability make individuals turn to their ethnic communities, as
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a sort of alternative statehoods, for the provision of public goods and this process can initiate a vicious
cycle in which ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy, which in turn reduce the
effectiveness of the state, and further intensify attitudes of illegitimacy.
In summary, the foregoing discussion highlights various ways through which ethnicity may
impact on the provision of public goods. The next section looks at specific on how ethnic
fractionalization impacts on public provision.

III.

Ethnic Fractionalization and Public Goods

Simple Model of Public Provision
Ethnic groups can impact on the provision of public goods in a number of ways. First, the foregoing
discussion suggests that there may be systematic differences in the preferences for the quantity and
type of public goods. The implication of differences in preferences across ethnic groups is that the
choice of quantity and mix of public goods can be expected to vary depending on the ethnic
composition of the population. This suggests that ethnic heterogeneity creates some conflict in the
choice of public goods in the community. Second, ethnic groups do behave much like special interest
groups that seek transfers from other groups. Interest-group behavior can impact the provision of
public goods as rulers favour members of their ethnic group. Third, ethnicity tends to undermine tax
compliance. Finally, the ethnic group is an important institution that economizes on the costs of
achieving cooperative solutions in prisoner’s dilemma situations. This means that ethnic groups can
self-provide goods efficiently. Below, we discuss some of the expected outcomes in public provision
given these theoretical foundations.
Consider a community with a population normalized at 1. For simplicity, we assume that there is
no entry or exit in or out of the community. The community provides public goods that are financed
entirely by taxes and there are no transfers from other communities or governments. For a public
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good g, the voter preferences are single peaked in terms of levels of spending.5 Members of the
community use majority rule to decide first on the level of taxation and then on the type and quantity
of public good. Given these assumption, the most preferred choice is one represented by the median
voter (Black 1958). To simplify the analysis, we assume that individuals in this community receive
exogenous income Y which is assumed to be the same for all members of the community.6 Thus, the
disposable income for members of the community y is Y-t.
To illustrate the impact of ethnicity on the provision of public goods, we start by presenting a
simple model of public goods provision as in Alesina and Easterly (1998). The utility of members in
this community can be generally expressed as U=U(g, c), where c is private consumption. For an
individual’s disposable income y, then c= (y-t). The public budget constraint is g=t. Because g is
chosen through a preference aggregation process, the utility from g to individual i depends very much
on the individual’s preferences relative to that of the median voter.
Following Alesina and Easterly , individual preferences are as expressed as
1.

Ui = ga (I-li) + y-g

where li is the preference distance between individual i’s most preferred public good and the actual
public good. That is, the distance from the median voter preference. Individual i’s preferred choice of
the size of the public good is obtained by solving
2.

Max Ui = ga (1-li) y-g which yields (3)

3.

gi* = [a(1-li)]1/(1-a)

If we define l1m as the median distance from the type most preferred by the median voter, the amount
of public good provided in equilibrium is given by:
4.

g* = [a(1-lim)]1/(1-a)

Single peaked preferences simplify the analysis as majority cycling is avoided.
The assumption of equal income helps in isolating differences in incomes associated with income. By assuming
same income, we are left with differences in preferences only due to ethnicity.
5
6
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Provision of Non-excludable goods
From the result in equation 4, it is possible to draw some conclusion relating to the public provision
and population characteristics. First, it is evident that the equilibrium amount of public good provided
decreases with the median distance from the median. Given that individual first vote on the amount of
tax, the larger the median distance from the median voter, the lower the level of g. In other words, in
communities with widely varying preferences, individuals will prefer lower taxes (smaller quantities of
public goods) and instead devote more resources to private consumption.
Figure 5 depicts preferences of particular public goods by different ethnic groups, Ea Eb Ec and Ed.
These are the quantities of public goods that the different ethnic groups would prefer. Consider a case
where there are only two ethnic groups, Ea and Eb. The preferences of the two groups are very
different with Ea preferring a much lower level of g whereas Eb prefers a much larger quantity. In this
polarized community, the “median distance from the median” is large. Public provision in the society
is likely to result in outcomes that are sub-optimal from the perspective of each of the groups. The
tendency then would for the ethnic groups to opt for lower taxes and thus lower amounts of the nonexcludable good. On the other hand, a community comprised of only Ec and Ed is likely to have higher
quantities of public good as the median distance from the median is relatively small as compared to the
case of Ea and Eb. In other words, c and d are likely to agree on the quantities of the public good to be
provided.
Ethnic conflicts over the provision of public goods could arise from the fact that different ethnic
groups live in different territories within the same country as discussed earlier. In this case, the
benefits of a public good vary across ethnic groups. Thus, ethnic groups are likely to oppose provision
of public goods whose benefit largely accrues to others. The basic conclusion is that ethnic
fragmentation lowers the amount of resources devoted to non-excludable public goods.
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Patronage goods
Previous discussion highlighted the interest-group behavior of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups compete
to control the state in order to transfer benefits to members of their group. To the extent that nonexcludable goods are likely to benefit all groups, they are not suitable vehicles to concentrate benefits
on any one particular group. Thus, governments in ethnically fractionalized societies are likely to
reduce spending on non-excludable goods and instead allocate more resources to “excludable” goods
that can be targeted to particular groups or individuals. A good example of such spending is on public
employment of members of a particular ethnic groups or targeted transfers to members of a
community. We refer to these targeted benefits as patronage goods (Kimenyi and Shughart 1989;
Alesina and Easterly 1998).
Let total spending G be composed of two goods-g1, non-excludable goods and g2, patronage
goods. Provision of g1 benefits all ethnic groups while g2 benefits only selected grops. The ratio
g1/(g1+g2) will therefore vary with the degree of ethnic polarization. The more polarized the society, the
higher the share of g2. In other words, polarization leads to a reduction in the share of non-excludable
public goods to the total spending.

Ethnic Provision of “club goods”
The foregoing discussion points to inefficiencies in the provision of public goods arising from ethnic
fractionalization. But the previous discussion also demonstrated that ethnic groups are important
institutions that reduce the transaction costs of reaching cooperative outcomes. In other words, ethnic
groups have advantage in solving prisoner’s dilemma situations that otherwise complicate collective
provision. At one level, ethnic provision of public goods is the result of marginalization by a dominant
group. At another level, ethnic provision is desirable because the cost of organizing collective
provision increases rapidly as more ethnic groups are involved. In essence, as cooperation weakens,
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public provision deteriorates. Another way of looking at this is the situation where ethnic preferences
for a public good are quite different as shown in Figure 6. In this case, the two ethnic group’s
preferences are represented by A and B with a bimodal distribution, The median voter outcomes for
the two are A* and B*. Given this distribution of preferences, decentralized provision would be best
for the two groups.

Evidence
Some of the more comprehensive studies on how ethnic groups impact on public provision have
focused on blacks and whites in the United States of America. Earlier studies focused on the provision
of education and particularly the impact of while flight.7 One of the triggers for white flight was in
the South following the striking down of dejure segregation following the Brown Versus Board of Education
decision in 1954. In this landmark court case, the Supreme Court of the United States declared that
separate education facilities were inherently unequal and thus made racial segregation illegal.8 During
the era of segregation, whites and blacks attended different public schools. Nevertheless, those
attended by blacks were largely inferior—poorly funded and poorly trained teachers, infrastructure, etc.
In this case, public provision varied across the ethnic groups purely because of racial discrimination.
After the High Court ruled against the segregationists, whites exited from public schools in large
numbers and joined private schools. The while flight was particularly evident in those localities that
had higher populations of blacks (Conlon and Kimenyi 1990 ). Given that whites were also the ones
primarily making decision on resource allocation, one of the outcome of white flight was a marked
reduction in funding of public schools generally. The other wave of white flight was triggered by the

White flight is used to refer to the wholesale migration of whites in communities or schools as the population
of blacks increases.
8 The idea of “separate and Equal” was entrenched following the Plessy V. Fergusin decision by the Supreme
Court in 1896.
7
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migration of blacks into the urban centers from rural south. As more blacks moved in, whites exited
into the suburbs. There was again subsequent deterioration in the quality of public provision in urban
centers populated by blacks. To a large extent, the differences in public goods following white flight
were largely the result of a diminished tax base due to low incomes but also because of reduced
transfer to these localities.
More recent studies show that ethnic diversity impacts on the provision of public goods in the
United States. Alesina, Bagur and Easterly (1999), find that higher levels of ethnic diversity associate
with low levels of provision of public goods across U.S. Municipalities. Specifically, they find that high
levels of ethnic diversity are associated with up to 25% lower funding for public schools. Below, we
provide evidence that links ethnicity to public goods provision in Africa.

Provision of non-excludable public goods and Patronage goods
Unfortunately, there are not many empirical studies that have focused specifically on the impact of
ethnicity on provision of public goods in Africa. The evidence available is basically of two types. The
first looks directly at the impact of ethnic diversity on a particular public good such as education. The
second approach looks at how ethnicity influences the allocation of public resources.
In a study on the impact of ethnic diversity on school funding by communities in Western Kenya,
Migue (2000), finds that higher levels of local ethnic diversity to be associated with sharply lower
primary school funding and much poorer school facilities. The community studied by Miguel is in
Busia and Teso Districts and is ethnically diverse with 67% of the population being Luhya, 26% Teso
and 5% Luo. Figure 7 shows what happens to school funding as the population mix changes. As is
evident, the level of funding is much higher when the communities are homogeneous and lowest when
the communities are of almost ethnically diverse. This evidence is quite consistent to the theoretical
proposition that ethnic diversity will result in lower funding of public goods. Miguel concludes that:
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Ethnic diversity is associated with sharply lower local school funding and worse school
facilities in rural Western Kenyan primary schools. Ethnic diversity across tribes rather than
across subtribes appears to be driving this negative relationship, suggesting that collective
action problems may be more severe in the presence of greater cultural and linguistic
differences. Donations from local fundraisers (harambees)—events that require considerable
community coordination and participation to be successful—are sharply lower in ethnically
diverse areas. Given the central role that harambees play in Kenya local public finance, the
results of this paper suggest that local ethnic diversity may be negatively associated with the
provision of other local public goods in Kenya (p. 30).
The discussion in the previous section alluded to the fact that one of the key issues is that leaders
in ethnically heterogeneous societies tend to allocate relatively more of a nations resources to regions
where members of their ethnic group reside. Brockerhoff and Hewett (1998) investigate whether
dominance of national political authority (by an ethnic group) confers advantages to members of the
ethnic group. The authors mainly make use of data from demographic and health surveys (DHS)
between 1990 and 1995. They begin with the premise that members of ethnic groups enjoy more
favorable conditions even outside urban areas as a result of nonrandom placement of resources or
uneven economic development patterns among the groups. They conclude that the dominant elite may
have channeled scarce state resources to areas where members of their ethnic groups are concentrated.
Table 1 shows the leadership of

a number of

African states focusing on ethnic political

dominance. The selected states are relatively stable and have had prolonged periods of political
dominance by one or two ethnic communities. The purpose is to investigate the extent to which
political dominance by an ethnic group influences public resource allocation. By and large, for the 11
selected countries results show public provision is significantly higher among groups that have had
high-level government representation than among other groups for example in terms of road
infrastructure, access to public health services and education (Tables 2 and 3).

In Mali, Niger and

Senegal, for example, complete immunization coverage is significantly higher among groups that have
had high-level government representation than among other groups. Among the Serer of Senegal a 20
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percent survival disadvantage around 1970 was reversed to a 20 percent advantage by around 1990.
This is despite the fact that the Serer are disproportionately concentrated in rural areas of Senegal
(Pison et al 1995). In rural Senegal, the median distance to a health facility is 34km for Serers as
compared to an average distance of 61.9 km for other ethnic groups. The Bambara and DjermaSonghai are much more likely than others to live in rural communities that are served by all weather
surfaces and in Ghana, 84 percent of Ashanti received some education, as compared to about 60
percent of others ethnic groups. In Niger, women who belong to the Djerma and Songhai are twice as
likely to have attended school, as are other women. Similar advantages are noticeable among groups
that have dominated political leadership such as the Baoule of Cote d’Ivore, Kikuyu of Kenya and the
Bemba of Zambia. Other evidence show that, in Kenya the Kalenjins enjoyed a decline (in child
mortality) of 37 percent between cohorts 1978-82 and 1983-87, coinciding with Moi’s consolidation of
power (Ungar, 1986). Child mortality levels of the Kikuyu were at par with those of many
industrialized countries of the North by the 1980’s (UNICEF, 1997). The under five mortality rate
during 1989-93 was 36.1 for the Kikuyu and 125.1 for the non-Kikuyu in Kenya.
Kenya is a good example of how rulers serve ethnic interests through patronage goods. Since
independence, Kenya has had only three presidents: Jomo Kenyatta, who ruled from 1963 until his
death in 1978; Daniel Arap Moi who ruled from 1978 to December 2002, and Mwai Kibaki who
became President in 2002. The First two presidents came from different ethnic groups each having a
different support base. The evidence available, strongly supports the idea that resource allocation in
Kenya has been determined more by political and ethnic consideration than by actual needs of the
population or established criteria of economic efficiency. Likewise, the appointment of senior civil
servants is largely influenced by ethnicity.
During Kenyatta’s era, the Kenyan cabinet was relatively small, but his ethnic group was over
represented. This was also true for all senior civil servants, police force and the military. Upon taking
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power, President Moi increased the number of cabinet positions and the civil service awarding the
positions to members of his ethnic group and other ethnic groups from his home province. At the
same time, he deliberately removed members of the cabinet and senior civil servants belonging to
Kenyatta’s ethnic group. Within a relatively short period of time, Moi had been able to totally change
the ethnic representation of the cabinet and the bureaucracy.

Accompanying these changes,

government spending increased rapidly as the new President made concerted efforts to distribute
benefits to members of his ethnic group and pay the bloated civil service. Table 4 shows the change in
the composition of the Kenyan cabinet following Moi’s rise to the presidency. The evidence here
again supports the previous discussion that rulers in Africa award senior positions to primarily,
members of their own ethnic group. This is a clear example of provision of patronage goods. Likewise,
the case of Burundi where the Tusti are dominated politics clearly reveals similar trends. Despite the
fact that the Hutus are the majority, they are hold few positions in the civil service of that country
(Table 5 and6 6). This evidence points to the fact hat allocation of excludable public goods is
influenced significantly by ethnic dominance in political leadership.

Ethnic Self-Provision of Public Goods
The discussion above shows that in ethnically fractionalized societies, we can expect a bias against
provision of non-excludable goods in favor of patronage goods. Governments intervene to extract
resources but only transfer to select individuals or communities. Because of the vacuum so left by the
state, ethnic groups organize to provide themselves with public goods. This is consistent with the idea
of absent-present state advanced by (Reddy 2001).
Reddy (2001, p. 296) argues that there is a “link between constructions of ethnic identities and the
ideology and character of authoritarian, despotic or oppressive states.” Such states are usually both
absent and present. At one level, they “are highly intrusive and extractive. At another level, these states
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are absent, failing to supply adequate or any welfare benefits, health, education, protection, justice,
national identity and so on.” Such state absence forces individuals to rely on their ethnic groups for
essential public goods and services (e.g., protection of self and property; education , health care; etc.).
In a country with a fully functioning democratic and representative government, local interests are
articulated at the national level by elected representatives. However, in authoritarian one-party and
military regimes, such as those that emerged in the African countries in the 1960s and 1970s, ethnic
organizations, particularly the “home town” associations came to represent the main (and in some
cases, the only) instrument for the articulation of local interests. These voluntary organizations not
only came to represent an important conduit through which local objectives were articulated at the
national level, but also served as the primary development agency for many villages and regions in the
African countries. In fact, it was through such organizations that Africans in the urban areas and the
Diaspora contributed to development in their villages and regions of origin. In the process, the home
town association has had a significant impact on governance and the allocation of resources in many
African countries.
In most African countries, home town associations are voluntary organizations designed to
provide mutual benefits for their members. In Cameroon and Nigeria, for example, hometown
associations have been formed by urban residents and those in the Diaspora (notably in the United
States and Western Europe) for the promotion of social and economic development in their
“ancestral” regions. In fact, through these organizations many “sons and daughters” of several villages
in Cameroon currently living in the Diaspora have been able to provide health care, educational and
water facilities for their kin back home. According to Barkan, McNulty and Ayeni (1991, p. 462), home
town associations in Côte d’Ivoire have provided
An array of basic services to residents of local communities—primarily and especially
secondary schools; medical services through the construction and staffing of health clinics and
even hospitals, electricity and telephone lines through the installation of utility poles, roads,

24

public meeting halls, and postal services through the construction of the necessary
infrastructure.
Schools, medical facilities, public utilities, and roads are all social overhead capital that should be
provided by the government. However, in the case where the state is absent, many ethnic-based
nongovernmental organizations have stepped in to provide these critical infrastructures. As argued by
Reddy (2001), ethnic-based associations were very critical to the survival of blacks under the apartheid
regime, which came into being in South Africa in 1948. Where the state refused to provide essential
services to the people, ethnic associations stepped in to feel the void. In the case where the state
provided inferior services or those that were considered detrimental to the welfare of the black
population (e.g., medical services provided by poorly trained personnel; education designed to prevent
blacks from acquiring the skills they needed to become competitive with whites in the labor force,
etc.), ethnic associations quite often came to the rescue and established structures for the provision of
alternative services.
Many of these ethnic-based associations usually have broad mandates, with social and economic
development, including the provision of essential social services (which, ordinarily are provided by the
government), as their main focus. However, the nature and kinds of activities that these organizations
engage in is determined, to a large extent, by the nature of government provision. In some African
countries where the ruling party uses public provision to gain votes and maintain its hold on power,
ethnic groups and regions that support the opposition are deprived of essential public services,
including social overhead capital for development. Many of these associations provide water, health
care, education (especially at the primary level), HIV/AIDS prevention instruction, including the
distribution of condoms, and other services, which are usually the purview of formal government.

IV.

Conclusion: Proposals for research
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The general message of this paper is that ethnic diversity influences the provision of public goods.
Theory points to the fact that ethnic fragmentation largely results in under provision of public goods.
Such under provision can in turn lead to underdevelopment. Unfortunately there is only limited
research that have empirically looked at how ethnicity impacts on public provision. A number of
research issues are proposed for additional research.
(a). Economics of Ethnic institutions: A lot of discussions on ethnic groups lack systematically articulated
theoretical foundations of the behaviour and organization of such groups. One area of research that
could help improve the understanding of outcomes in ethnically fragmented countries is to model
ethnic groups as institutions for collective action. In other words, such research should be able to
provide clear insights of the behaviour of ethnic groups and expected outcomes under different
environments.
(b). Empirical evidence of public goods provision: As observed previously, empirical evidence on ow ethnicity
impacts on public goods provision is scarce. This is a fruitful area of research that could add value to
the current understanding of ethnicity.
( c ). Tax Compliance:

Theory points to low tax compliance in ethnically fragmented societies.

However, there is limited evidence to support such assertions. Cross country and cross community
studies could shed some light on how ax compliance is impacted on by ethnic diversity.
(d). Institutional Reforms:

The implication of the results reported in this paper is that ethnic

fragmentation is not good for development. It lowers trust, tax compliance, is associated with ethnic
rent-seking, inefficient wealth transfers and an overall under-provision of public goods. But ethnic
heterogeneity I a given and cannot be wished away. The issue then is to study institutional reforms that
could reduce the adverse consequences of ethnicity.
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Table 1: Dominant ethnic groups in 11 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Country
Ethnic
Percent on
Head of state from
Group

Central African M’baka
Republic
Yakoma

National
Population
7
8

Ethnic Group

1966-79 (Bokasa)
1980-93 (Kolingba)

Cote d’Ivore

Baoule

20

1960-1999
(Houphouet-Boigny ; Bedie)

Ghana

Ashanti

28

1969-79 (Several)
1982- 2001 (Rawlings)*

Kenya

Kikuyu
Kalenjin

21
11

1963-1978 (Kenyatta)
1978-2002 (Moi)

Mali

Bambara

31

1968-91 (Traore)

Namibia

Ovambo

46

1990- present (Nujoma)

Niger

Djerma-Songhai

24

1960-93 (Lule; Binaira)

Rwanda

Hutu

90

1962-94 (Kayibanda; Habyarimana)

Senegal

Serer

19

1960- present (Senghor; Diouf)

Uganda

Baganda

16

1979 (Lule; Binaira)

Zambia
Bemba
15
1964-91 (Kaunda)
*Rawlings is non-Ashanti; his wife is a member of the Ashanti royal family.
Source: Brockerhoff and Hewett (1998) (attributed to Morrisson, Mitchell and Paden 1989). Note that
a few changes were made in the table to make it current.
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Table 2: Characteristics of ethnic groups in 11 countries (in percent)a
Women
Children Received
Country and
Attended
Complete
Survey year
School
Immunizationb
Central African republic 1994/95
Yakoma
71.3**
63.3**
37.7
M’baka
67.9**
All other
44.5
36.4
Cote d’Ivore, 1994
Baoule
49.5**
46.3**
All other
39.0
34.8
Ghana, 1993
Ashanti
84.1**
60.8**
All other
60.4
49.7
Kenya, 1993
Kikuyu
90.5**
89.2**
Kalenjin
80.1
72.9
All other
80.7
70.7
Mali, 1995/96
37.8**
Bambara
20.6*
All other
18.0
31.3
Namibia, 1992
Ovambo
88.2**
60.3**
European
97.2**
61.4**
All other
78.4
46.9
Niger, 19992
22.8**
Djerma-Songhai
16.8**
All other
8.9
13.9
Rwanda, 1992
78.3*
Hutu
60.3*
**
Tutsi
80.2
84.9
Senegal, 1992,1993
Serer
25.3
63.4**
All other
26.9
49.0
Uganda, 1995
62.5**
Baganda
95.1**
All other
64.3
49.3
Zambia, 1992
65.4
Bemba
89.0**
All other
81.0
64.5

* p ≤ 0.05,** p ≤ 0.01
aStatistics

are derived from women ages 15-49. bBased on children ages12-59 months. Received BCG,
measles, DPT 1-3, and polio 1-3 immunisation.
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Table 3: Rural community characteristics of ethnic group members in six countries
Median Distance to
Percent with
Public health
All-Weather Road
Facility (km.)
Yakoma
M'baka
Other

Central African Republic, 1994/1995
3.3*
12.9**
1.3

4.1*
3.3**
4.5

Baoule
Other

Cote d'Ivore, 1994
41.6**
31.3

3.9*
4.5

Kikuyu
Kalenjin
Other

Kenya, 1993
__
__
__

14.6**
17.9*
19.8

Bambara
Other

Mali, 1995/1996
9.9**
5.9

49.2**
62.5

Niger, 1992
16.8*
9.9

22.1*a
13.0a

Djerma-Songhai
Other

Senegal, 1992/1993
65.9**
47.8

Serer
Other

33.8**
61.9

* p ≤ 0.05,* * p ≤ 0.01
aPercent

living within 50 kilometres of a public health facility.
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Table 4: Ethnicity and provision of patronage goods-Kenya

Number of
members
% of members of
Kenyatta's cabinet
retained
% of members of
Kenyatta's tribe
retained

Last cabinet
(Kenyatta)
1978

First cabinet
(Moi)
1982

Second cabinet
(Moi)
1988

22

28

34

-

35

14

-

14

3

Table 5: Burundi: ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC SECTOR CIVIL SERVICE POSTS
IN 1997
Hutu
Tutsi
Twa
Office of the president
1
98
0
Central Committee of Single Party
2
50
0
Administration of single party
3
52
0
Ministers
5
13
0
Cabinet directors
1
17
0
Ministry Permanent Secretaries
0
40
0
Province Governors
2
13
0
Ambassadors
1
21
0
Embassy Senior Diplomats
0
88
0
Army Barrack Commanders
0
20
0
Army Officers
2
398
0
Army Sergeant and Privates
30
11970
0
State Owned Companies Directors
5
252
0
Hospital Directors
1
19
0
University Lecturers
10
80
0
Secondary Schools Directors and Inspectors
6
89
0
Justice Prosecutors
0
66
0
Magistrates
5
92
0
Court Presidents
1
7
0
Judiciary Police Officers and Inspectors
0
400
0
Source: Ntibazonkiza, R. (1993) in http://www.dse.de/ef/business/nkurunzi.htm
Note from the author suggest that the statistics may exaggerate the extent of Tutsi domination.
Nevertheless the fact that the Tutsi dominate is unquestionable and, at the very least, this is the
message the figures should convey.
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Table 6: Burundi: ETHNIC AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS
ETHNIC
Tutsis
Hutus
Twa
TOTAL
GROUP
REGION
OF
ORIGIN
Bururi province
60
Remaining
14 29
provinces
89
TOTAL
Source: Raw data from ICG

3
8

0
0

63
37

11

0

100

39

40

